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This study outlines how proposed changes to international capital adequacy standards – commonly
referred to as “Basel II” – will reinforce financial stability.
Basel II is designed to contribute to the prevention of individual bank failures by making minimum
capital standards more flexible and aligning them more closely with actual risks and changes in the
level of risk.
By bringing regulatory capital closer to the concept of economic capital that banks use in their
internal management, and by going to the core of banks’ financial information systems, the proposed
changes will foster better control of risks.
By reducing credit disruptions, the changes should help to limit the severity of macro-economic and
sectoral downturns and thereby improve financial stability.
Concerns have been expressed about the potential “procyclicality” of the new standards, and the
possibility of sharp swings in regulatory capital requirements leading to dramatic shifts in the
availability of credit. These concerns, while theoretically appealing, do not appear warranted
in practice.
The Basel Committee took steps early on to ensure that cyclical effects would be moderated, while
still achieving the goal of making capital ratios more risk-sensitive, more closely related to the bank’s
management of its “risk-return” tradeoff, and therefore more useful as an internal control tool.
In contrast with Basel I, which is external to banks’ methods of management, Basel II incorporates
an advanced IRB approach. It can therefore figure as a central element in banks’ strategic planning.
The success of the proposed changes will depend on how they are applied by bank managers and on
the vigilance of bank supervisors in overseeing their implementation. Numerous contacts and on-site
examinations carried out to date are encouraging in this regard.
A hoped-for reform in the rules on provisioning, consistent with the new capital standard – factoring in
ex ante the impact of expected but unrealized credit losses over the credit cycle instead of concentrating
them at the lowest point of the cycle – would contribute significantly to financial stability.Financial stability and the New Basel Accord
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I
n April 2003, after five years of work and
numerous consultations, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision published its third
consultative document setting forth proposals for
reforming the international Accord on banks’ capital
adequacy. This document, and the consultative
processes that individual national supervisors have
conducted in parallel, have drawn comments and
proposals from all interested parties, making it possible
to envisage final adoption of Basel II at the start of 2004.
1 The capital ratio is the ratio of regulatory capital on the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet to the sum of the bank’s risk-weighted assets.
This ratio must be at least 8%.
2 See also “Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord” on the site of the BIS: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3ov.pdf.
Box 1
The provisions of Basel II
The new capital adequacy ratio 1, Basel II 2, rests on three pillars:
Pillar 1 increases risk sensitivity in the calculation of exposures and the resulting capital charge, with the goal
of improving micro-prudential stability.
Three methods are proposed for measuring credit risk:
– the “standardised approach” (SA) based on external credit ratings,
– the relatively simple “foundation internal-ratings based” approach (FIRB),
– the more sophisticated “advanced internal-ratings based” approach (AIRB).
In the last two approaches, capital charges are based on the internal credit ratings that banks assign to their
counterparties.
A bank’s overall capital requirement is obtained by adding the capital requirement for credit risk to separately
calculated requirements for market risk and operational risk.
Pillar 2 refines the assessments made under Pillar 1.
It consists of:
– the bank’s analysis of risks not covered by Pillar 1 (interest-rate risk, liquidity risk, concentrations, “stress
tests”) and a review of actions that it should take to manage those risks (additional capital, provisioning,
internal control or risk-management measures);
 
– the bank’s calculation of the amount of capital it needs to support its activities (economic capital), possibly
using methods different from those used to calculate regulatory capital;
– the bank supervisor’s assessment of the bank’s risk profile, which the supervisor compares with the bank’s
own assessments (see points above); and the supervisor’s identification of any additional requirements that
should be imposed, whether in the form of capital requirements in excess of minimum requirements or other
suitable measures.
Pillar 3 improves financial transparency in order to promote greater market discipline.
Supervisory approval to use the internal ratings-based approach is conditional upon the bank’s complying with the
disclosure requirements of Pillar 3.
A fourth Pillar recognising the possibility of setting provisions against expected but unrealised losses would help
to improve consistency between prudential and accounting aspects of bank regulation, but this step cannot be
undertaken until there is greater international harmonisation between accounting and prudential standards.Financial stability and the New Basel Accord
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By aligning capital requirements more closely with
actual risks and providing incentives to improve risk
management, the proposed reforms strengthen the
foundations of every bank, and thus should be seen
more as an opportunity than as a burden. The fact
remains, however, that better risk management
requires, as a prerequisite for efficiency, better data
and the adoption of the new methods throughout
the banking community.
1|1  A new system
for measuring regulatory capital
that better reflects banks’ risks
The internal ratings-based approaches bring regulatory
capital closer to economic capital, the concept used by
banks to allocate capital among different lines of
business and to measure their risk/return 1 trade-off.
However, regulatory and economic capital cannot
be perfectly matched up, because the objectives
pursued by bank supervisors and banks are not
identical.
Indeed, supervisors are concerned not only with
overseeing individual credit institutions, but also
with ensuring the overall financial stability of the
banking system.
This difference in objectives can explain the different
approaches adopted by supervisors and banks regarding
the recognition of the benefits of diversification or the
treatment of double-default risk in guarantees.
Having surveyed major banks in industrialised
countries, the Basel Committee concluded that there
was not yet an accepted standard for full credit-risk
modelling which it could use as the basis for its
regulatory framework. For this reason, the Committee
indicated that it would reopen the issue of credit risk
modelling at a later date, leaving time for banks’ work
on this subject to achieve greater convergence.
In the meantime, the internal ratings-based
approach can provide the foundation for economic
capital requirements.
In the course of 2003, information-gathering missions
conducted by the General Secretariat of the Banking
Commission at major French banking institutions
revealed a broad diversity of approaches to defining
and using economic capital. In every institution,
however, the parameters used in Basel II 2 constituted
the fundamental elements of the calculation.
By aligning regulatory capital more closely with
economic capital, Basel II enhances banks’ safety
while simplifying their management. Financial
stability is also reinforced by the fact that the
supervisory parameters in Basel II are continuous
variables, which substantially reduces “cut-off”
effects compared to the current situation.
1|2 An opportunity
for strategic risk management
Because internal ratings systems are at the core of
the process of credit allocation, they provide the
foundation for establishing a comprehensive system
of strategic asset allocation.
1| The new prudential framework will help
prevent individual bank failures
1 See for example Bank of Spain.
2 See the glossary at the end of this article for definitions of these parameters.
In Europe, the text published by the Basel Committee
should be reviewed in 2004 in the form of a draft
EU directive. Once adopted, the directive will be
transposed into French law through a regulation. As
from 31 December 2005, banks will be required to
provide bank supervisors with two calculations of
their capital ratios, based on the current and future
methods. Final implementation of Basel II in Europe
is currently scheduled for 31 December 2006.
While it is widely recognized that the new prudential
standards will improve the prevention of individual
bank failures, concern has been expressed about the
macro-and mesoeconomic consequences of the
reforms. This has led the Basel Committee to
introduce several measures designed to reinforce
global financial stability.Financial stability and the New Basel Accord
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Diagram 1
How internal ratings systems determine structure
As indicated in diagram 1, this approach makes it
possible to obtain a detailed calculation of the
probability of default of each customer, and of the
loss the bank will incur from each transaction if
the customer defaults (after taking into account
risk-mitigation techniques: collateral, guarantees,
hedges, netting, etc.).
The internal ratings approach can be used to
estimate both unexpected losses and mean
expected losses.
It would therefore be desirable to develop, on the
basis of these elements, a policy for monitoring
exposure limits, a pricing policy (with pricing based
on risk-adjusted return), and a mechanism for setting
provisions based on mean expected losses, and to
measure the performance of each line of business
and the amount of economic capital needed to
support them.
Appropriate procedures, based on these principles
and applied from the level of individual credit
officers on up to senior managers, will enable the
bank to establish a common language across all
lines of business, which facilitates the
communication of strategic planning goals. All
types of risk (credit, market, operational, and other
risks) are measured and interpreted using the
same “yardstick”, making for comparisons between
different lines of business and facilitating the
dialogue between the bank and its supervisor
concerning the three Pillars of the Accord.
1|3 The need for higher quality
data and a general adoption
of reforms throughout the bank
The multiplicity of options offered in Basel II
encourages banks to improve their risk management
techniques, since banks that adopt more advanced
methods are eligible for slightly lower capital
requirements. Using data collected from banks in
G10 countries (the “third Quantitative Impact Study”
or QIS3), the requirements of Basel II have been
calibrated in such a way as to give banks a modest
incentive to move to the more advanced methods,
while at the same time maintaining the current overall
level of capital in the global banking system.
In the internal ratings-based approach, the bank
decides whether it will model all or only some of the
variables. Greater use of the bank’s own internal
estimates of loss parameters is possible, subject to
validation by the supervisor. This greater flexibility is
accompanied by more stringent qualitative standards
for the information systems used in assigning and
monitoring grades (tracking of ratings, independent
review of rating assignments, audit trails, monitoring
of the consistency of internal ratings assigned in
different parts of the banking group, and reconciliation
of risk-management and accounting data).
Thus, the internal ratings-based approach requires
a significant investment in reliable and
comprehensive financial information systems, and
internal controls of the highest quality.
It is essential that senior bank management present
the Basel II reforms as an opportunity for each line of
business to meet its business objectives, and not simply
as a tool for the departments responsible for risk
management. Thus, for example, enriching the
bank’s data on customer default and loss rates can lead
to a better understanding of customer characteristics,
more precision in tailoring offerings and marketing to
“prospects”, and more accurate pricing of risks. For
financial managers, the allocation of bank capital can
be based on an objective measure of risk-adjusted
return. And the public disclosures required under
Pillar 3 can permit greater transparency and a richer
dialogue with analysts and investors.
The next section of this study outlines some of the
concerns that have been expressed in the course of
the Basel II consultative process regarding possible
detrimental effects of the reforms. The final section
of the study describes the actions taken by the Basel
Committee to address these concerns.
Allocation of capital  
to business lines 
(strategic asset allocation)
Ratings  
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2|1 Procyclicality 
“Procyclicality” refers to the notion that capital
requirements could increase the severity of the
economic cycle. It is generally recognized that the
credit cycle is correlated with the economic cycle:
the credit cycle is characterized by a pronounced
increase in loan-loss provisions and a contraction
in the supply of credit during periods of recession,
and a decline in provisions and resurgence in
lending during periods of growth 3. The concern has
been expressed that Basel II could amplify the credit
cycle, and that this in turn could amplify the
economic cycle. This concern rests on the notion
that fluctuations in the credit ratings of bank
customers would translate into variations in capital
requirements, stimulating lending in periods of
growth and constraining credit in periods of
recession. Moreover, the contraction in credit
induced by Basel II would impact all
credit-seekers simultaneously, and would be felt all
the more sharply because it followed a period of
easy credit during the preceding period of growth.
The result would be to exacerbate the decline in
economic activity.
This debate on the procyclicality of ratings-based
systems first surfaced in the context of the use of
external ratings in the new standardized approach.
Although the rating agencies indicated that it was
their practice to rate “through the economic cycle”,
several studies contested that claim, pointing to a
rise in the frequency of rating downgrades during
periods of recession.
More recently, a review of internal ratings assigned
by large international banks has shown a diversity
of approaches. Some banks base their one-year credit
ratings on the stock prices of their counterparties,
using “KMV” – type models of firm value. This
method of rating “at a point in the cycle” leads to a
large variation in internal ratings over time.
Other banks seek to assign ratings that reflect the
same probability of default over a medium-term
horizon that incorporates the possibility of economic
recession, and they compare these ratings with those
produced by the external rating agencies. Such a
philosophy of rating “through the cycle” leads to greater
stability in ratings over time.
In France, the ratings systems used by large banks
favor the objective of stability through the cycle in
the ratings assigned to firms, while incorporating
information – particularly market information – that
might lead the bank to revise a rating.
Some banking economists have argued that
regulatory capital requirements should be fixed or
even counter-cyclical (Persaud, 2002) in order to
reduce systemic risk, instead of more sensitive to
the business cycle as would be the case under Basel II.
A static comparison between Basel I and Basel II
ratios would indicate that the former depends only
on exposure volumes (the amounts of credit
outstanding) and is completely insensitive to
variations in counterparty credit quality (except in
the case of defaults resulting in the recording of
write-offs or provisions), while the latter depends
on credit quality, as reflected in the credit ratings of
counterparties, as well as on exposure volumes.
An analysis which stopped at that observation would
conclude that, for banks whose internal ratings vary
with the business cycle, the new ratio is more volatile
than the old ratio.
However, the analysis must also take into account the
way that banks will adapt to the new regulatory
framework. They will manage their Basel II ratio
dynamically, not just adjusting their capital levels,
but also managing the amount of credit outstanding
– for example through classic and synthetic
securitisation and the adoption of risk-mitigation
techniques – so as to reduce their risk exposures.
Increasing capital and cutting back on new credit
are but two ways among many to respond to
fluctuations in the ratio; other alternatives can easily
be implemented.
3 For a stylized explanation of procyclicality, see for example Berger and Udell (2003).
2| Concerns about the reforms focus
on their macro-economic consequencesFinancial stability and the New Basel Accord
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The critical advantages of the new ratio are, first, that it
functions as a key element in the bank’s strategic planning
process, incorporating a prospective dimension, rather
than simply being computed ex post; and second, that
the charges which it imposes are proportional to risk,
which ensures responsiveness and progressivity in the
behaviour of banks and thereby improves financial
stability.
The experience of the past ten years indicates the need
for improvements in the current capital framework.
Economic and financial crises have many causes, but
the banking system and its regulation play a key role.
Because the “Cooke” ratio was not a part of
banks’ strategic planning processes, it could not help
them to minimize the impact of economic and
) s n o i l l i m R U E n i (
e h c n a r Tg n i t a Rt n u o m At n e m e r i u q e r l a t i p a C
A e s s a l CA A A2 90
B e s s a l CA A2 0
C e s s a l CB B B2 0
D e s s a l CB B1 0
e h c n a r t y t i u q Ed e t a r n U3 3 = % 8 x % 0 5 2 , 1 x 3
l a t o T0 0 13
k n a b e h t r o f t n e m e r i u q e r l a t i p a C
r e f s n a r t k s i r d n a n o i t a s i t i r u c e s r e t f a3
d e e r f l a t i p a c y r o t a l u g e R5
financial crises arising in different regions (Asia in
1997, Russia in 1998, Argentina in 2000, etc.) and
sectors (commercial real estate in France during the
mid-1990s, internet and telecommunications
beginning in 2000). The response of banks to regulatory
constraints  – prudential as well as accounting (absence
of dynamic provisioning) – probably aggravated the
economic cycle. A lack of clear forecasts led to credit
shifts that were all the greater because they were
delayed.
Thus stability in regulatory capital requirements
through the economic cycle has not necessarily
translated into micro- and macro-economic stability
in recent decades. This is one of the reasons why
the new ratio has been designed to be more sensitive
to the economic cycle.
2|2 Increases in capital 
A second concern relates to the fact that the new
ratio is liable to lead to excessively large increases 4 in
regulatory capital requirements.
Clearly, a risk-sensitive Accord will produce regulatory
capital requirements that vary with fluctuations in
credit quality: when credit quality deteriorates, capital
requirements will increase. This is both healthy and
desirable, for the reasons indicated above. Is there,
however, a risk that swings in capital requirements
will be so large as to be unacceptable, either globally
or for certain sectors of the economy?
A number of studies have attempted to quantify the
degree to which capital requirements will fluctuate over
time under Basel II, using historic data on variability
in the quality of credit portfolios.
Caution should be applied when interpreting such
static comparative studies in the context of a
structural change such as Basel II, which will
profoundly modify the behaviour of banks in ways
that are difficult to model in advance.
In the absence of internal bank data, the studies
mentioned above have generally relied on data from
external rating agencies or on “KMV”-type market
data covering large, mostly American firms. Because
of this methodological bias, the studies have reported
higher historical volatility in regulatory capital than
would be the case in France 5.
4 The possibility of sharp decreases in capital requirements seems to generate less concern, but they can be just as dangerous prudentially since
they can lead to an oversupply of credit which can facilitate the development of financial bubbles.
5 See for example the estimates produced by the Federation of German Banks (www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3).
Box 2
Example of the reduction
in regulatory capital
The example concerns the securitisation of a
portfolio of bank loans granted to firms, with the
portfolio totalling EUR 100 million.
Before securitisation
In the case of the current “Cooke” ratio, the
prudential capital charge is:
100 x 100% x 8% = EUR 8 million
After securitisation
In the case of the new ratio, a classic securitisation
with the most subordinated tranche deducted from
capital (equivalent to a risk-weight of 1,250%) is
liable to lead to a EUR 5 million reduction in
regulatory capital requirements.Financial stability and the New Basel Accord
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For the French banking system, a simulation of the
capital requirements generated by applying the
internal ratings-based approach to the period
1992-2001 has shown a variation in regulatory capital
requirements on the order of 25% from peak to
trough of the economic cycle.
In diagram 2, below, IRB requirements are estimated
using rating tools employed by the Bank of France
and the Banking Commission  6. These estimates,
which cover a fairly large number of firms, are
undoubtedly closer to reality that studies based only
on ratings of credit rating agencies or on models that
rely on market data.
Diagram 2
Ex-post simulation of evolution in capital
requirements (FIRB) for industrial loan portfolios
and the rate of growth in GDP
(%) (100 in 1993)
Sources: INSEE – data adjusted for seasonal and working day effects (GDP) –
and Oung (2003)
Moreover, the overall calibration of Basel II, using
data from the third Qualitative Impact Study (QIS3),
will ensure that the overall level of regulatory capital
for international banks in the G10 countries is
maintained. Fears of a global increase in prudential
requirements are therefore unfounded.
The March 2002 data used in the QIS3 represent
only a snapshot of bank balance sheets at one
moment in the credit cycle, and not their evolution
over a complete cycle. For several major G10
countries (United States, Japan, Germany), this
snapshot is being taken at a moment when
commercial defaults are at a cyclical peak. The
resulting calibration is accommodating for banks,
since many banks’ balances sheets are already at
the bottom of the cycle.
Another reason to avoid attaching too much
importance to this concern is the fact that all G10
banks have for many years maintained actual capital
levels well in excess of regulatory minimums.
In French banks, the average amount of core
(“Tier one”) capital, which is the form of capital most
closely watched by bank analysts and rating
agencies, exceeds 8%: more than twice the regulatory
minimum (4%). This margin represents a buffer
which makes it easier for banks to deal with increases
in regulatory requirements.
Banks generally prefer to hold more capital than the
regulatory minimum in order to obtain a desired
credit rating for the bank. The buffer can also result
from calculations of the economic capital necessary
to cover total unexpected losses. The measures taken
by banks to cover all of their risks – including the
step of holding additional capital – will be the subject
of dialogue between the bank and its supervisor
under Pillar 2. This is clearly a stabilizing element.
2|3 Sectoral effects
In addition to questions about procyclicality and
the global level of prudential requirements, the
possibility of shifts in the composition of the supply of
bank credit has been raised as a third concern.
Because Basel II aligns capital requirements more
closely with actual risks, it could alter supply and
pricing in certain sectors.
Businesses – particularly small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), which depend heavily on bank
loans for financing – and emerging-market countries
are sometimes cited as potential “losers” in the Basel
reforms, while households are cited as “winners”.
It is difficult at this stage to reach any general
conclusions on this point, since prudential
requirements will depend on the credit quality of
each counterparty at the end of 2006, when Basel II
takes effect. Nevertheless, the simulations that have
been carried out to date for SMEs and emerging
countries do not all support the hypothesis.
For SMEs, several prospective studies conducted
in different European countries – Belgium
(Masschelein, 2003), Spain (Saurina and Trucharte,
2003) and France (Dietsch, 2003) – point to a reduction
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6 Banque de France ratings are assigned to more than 180,000 businesses (www.banque-france.fr/fr/info).Financial stability and the New Basel Accord
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As to the impact of Basel II on emerging-market countries,
some banking economists have (Griffith-Jones et al.,
2003) expressed their disappointment that the
diversification benefits of lending to emerging-market
are not taken into account. Demonstrating these
benefits statistically has, however, proved difficult.
Leaving aside the costs that banks can incur when
they enter these markets, the 1997 Asian crisis and
the contagion effects that accompanied it argue for
caution in giving credit for the asserted benefits of
diversification. For this reason, the Basel Committee
chose not to provide a preferential treatment for loans
to emerging-market countries.
This decision has generally been accepted by
supervisors in the countries concerned. This is
largely due to the establishment by the Basel
Committee of a forum – the “CPLG” 7 – dedicated to
the principle that each country should be able to
analyse its situation objectively and set a reasonable
timetable for implementing Basel II. The Basel
Committee has also proposed a “Simplified
Standardized Approach” with several features
designed specifically for emerging-market countries.
While the implementation of the Basel I (Cooke) ratio
was spread over a long period of time, the
consultative process put in place for the Basel II
reforms should help to reinforce financial stability.
For loans to individuals, the Basel Committee analysed
a large volume of data provided by banks in the
course of four impact studies. These studies provided
an empirical basis for calculations leading to the
hierarchy of risks proposed in the third consultative
document (CP3). In all of the Committee’s member
countries, loans to households were found to be less
risky than loans to businesses.
The suggestion that “retail banks will be given
preferential treatment” is based on a comparison
with the Basel I risk weighting for retail exposures,
which was never really based on scientific analysis
of the data. The data collected so far indicate that
the capital charges imposed on the activities of retail
banks are well in excess of their actual risk, and thus,
that retail banks are currently penalized.
Is there a risk that removing this penalty will induce
households in France and elsewhere to become
over-indebted, with the social and economic risks
that this entails?
7 The “Core Principles Liaison Group” (CPLG) is a forum which brings together non-“G10” countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China,  the
Czech Republic, Hong-Kong, India, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa and West Africa); several “G10” countries,
including France; and several international organizations.
One should note that the cost of capital is only one
of the determinants of the cost of credit.
The largest component of the cost of credit is the
cost of refinancing: i.e., the cost of the resource
that appears on the liability side of the bank’s
balance sheet. The next largest component is the
cost of the human resources and materials needed
to raise the financing and extend the loan. The
third component is the cost of risk covered by
provisions. The fourth, and smallest in size, is the
regulatory cost of capital.
Thus, while changes in the ratio have a clear
impact on the risk-return tradeoff for customer
transactions, and therefore on the relative
attractiveness of business lines within the bank,
the interest rates applied to retail banking
transactions should not change dramatically
simply as a result of Basel II.
2|4 The risk of uniformity
in modeling techniques
A fourth concern involves the risk of too much
uniformity in the tools that banks use to manage credit
risk, due to all of them employing the same
regulatory model. The holders of this hypothesis
(Aglietta, 2003) fear that the homogenization of
credit rating systems will not only reduce their
efficacy, but above all promote herd behaviour,
increasing financial instability (Persaud, 2003). If
all banks base their strategies on the same
historical observations, there is indeed a risk that
fashion will play too great a role in setting
strategies, leading to sudden changes in direction
affecting the entire industry. However, banks base
their strategies on more than just the analysis of
historical data; their tools have a prospective
dimension which varies widely from one bank to
another.
The Basel II framework is derived from the banking
industry’s best practices. The result is a regulatory
model (Gordy, 2002b) that is easy for banks to apply
to the calculation of regulatory requirements. The
dangers of excessive uniformity should not be
exaggerated, since the Basel Committee left banks
considerable latitude in choosing the rating
techniques best suited to their activities.Financial stability and the New Basel Accord
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Large commercial banks in France use a variety of
techniques to assign ratings to large businesses,
SMEs, professionals, and individuals.
In fact, a multitude of techniques are available:
credit scoring, behavioural scoring, econometric
modeling, expert systems, scoring ladders calibrated
by iteration of the results, budget classes, and models
replicating the scoring of credit agencies. Different
banks choose different approaches depending on
their culture, their organization, and their data. The
role of external ratings (generated by credit rating
agencies, the Banque de France, etc.) varies from
“an explicit element used in calculating a score” to
“a separate factor that is compared with the internal
rating calculated by the bank” to “used in the overall
fine-tuning of the bank’s rating methods”.
The relative importance of qualitative versus
quantitative factors varies between banks, even if
some common patterns can be observed.
Thus, in rating large corporations, banks rely
primarily on an analysis of financial variables,
along with qualitative factors such as the quality
of management – but the role of the analyst remains
fundamental. For SMEs, banks rely more on rating
scales and on systems which guide/constrain the
rating official. For inter-bank and sovereign
borrowers, the banks resort to models which
replicate the ratings of credit rating agencies. Even
for retail banks, the use of separate scoring models
for each type of transaction is not the only approach
used: some institutions, following the practice for
rating commercial loans, assign a single rating
which applies to all credits extended to a given
customer.
Just as there is variation in the models used by banks,
so the methods used to assign ratings – while respecting
both the letter and the spirit of the Basel framework –
are more diverse and therefore contribute more to
stability than is commonly realized.
In continental Europe, universal banks tend to place
the customer, rather than the type of transaction, at
the center of the commercial relationship. Because
banks know their customers well – particularly if
they monitor the customer’s financial accounts –
they generally adopt a medium-term view in making
any necessary rating changes, which permits them
to accompany their customers “through the cycle”.
Under Basel II, banks must associate one-year
probabilities of default with their rating hierarchy,
but the segmentation of the hierarchy is determined
based on a long-term average (usually 5 years), with
a conservative bias 8.
In this system, deterioration in the credit quality of
a customer does not imply any short-term change
in the average probability of default associated with
each rating grade. Rather, the customer migrates
from one rating grade to another grade with a higher
probability of default.
The characteristics of such a system (ratings
calibrated on average default probabilities;
subjective, ordinal ratings; and annual review of the
ratings of all customers, spread over the course of
the year) help to reduce volatility and avoid possible
overreactions.
Studies carried out by the Banking Commission on
counterparties common to several French banks
indicate that while there is some convergence in
rating methodologies, there are also significant
differences, with some banks making greater use of
the full range of ratings than others. This observation
does not, at this stage, validate the hypothesis that
banks are all using the same tools to manage risks.
The Basel Committee takes seriously the possibility
of interactions between the Basel II proposals and
financial stability. This has led it to propose a
number of remedies.
8 See § 425 of the third consultative document (www.bis.org/bcbs).Financial stability and the New Basel Accord
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The desire to avoid potential procyclical effects
has led to a variety of changes in the Basel II
proposals at various stages in the process of
calculating capital requirements.
3|1 Input data (internal rating
assignments, probabilities
of default and associated)
Economists are divided on the link between stability
in internal rating assignments and macro-financial
stability. Some economists argue on theoretical
grounds (Catarineu et al., 2003) that banks will not
voluntarily choose a rating scheme that is designed
to be more stable over the cycle, and that supervisors
therefore need to impose stability in rating systems.
Other economists contend that such a policy on the
part of supervisors would undermine the tools that
banks use to monitor their risks (Gordy, 2002a).
The Basel Committee, while not taking a position in
this debate, has made allowance for different
approaches, stating, for example, that the time horizon
for estimating ratings – normally one year – can be
set longer  9. Furthermore, the Basel Committee
endorses the use of different estimation methods for
associating one-year default probabilities with rating
grades, or loss given default rates to different facilities,
providing they are based on long historical observation
periods and are sufficiently conservative.
It does not appear desirable, from the point of
view of financial stability, to place further
constraints on banks’ internal rating methods,
since this would lead to divergence between the
ratings banks use in calculating regulatory
requirements and the ratings they use for internal
management purposes.
3|2 The supervisory model for
calculating regulatory requirements
The Basel Committee has reduced the effect that a
deterioration in ratings has on capital requirements,
relative to earlier consultative documents.
One example of this is the decision, as part of the
calibration exercise, to flatten the risk-weight
curve for corporate portfolios. The corporate
portfolio has been split in two, using a threshold
of EUR 50 million to distinguish SMEs from other
businesses.
Diagram 3
Capital risk-weight curves for corporate exposures


































9 See § 376 of the third consultative document:  “Although the time horizon used in PD estimation is one year (as described in paragraph 409), banks
must use a longer time horizon in assigning ratings. A borrower rating must represent the bank's assessment of the borrower’s ability and
willingness to contractually perform despite adverse economic conditions or the occurrence of unexpected events.”
3| Several features of the reform
will contribute to financial stabilityFinancial stability and the New Basel Accord
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On the whole, loans to SMEs, by virtue of the large
number of exposures, are less sensitive to the
economic climate than other corporate loans. This
empirical observation has been taken into account in
the formula for calculating capital requirements by
varying the assumed correlation between assets as a
function of the SME’s probability of default  10. The
overall effect is to reduce the regulatory requirement
for SMEs by approximately 10% relative to the
requirement for larger businesses (see diagram 3).
10 See § 242 of the third consultative document for the formula.
Box 3
The treatment of French bank exposures to SMEs in Basel II
Using the definition of SMEs that emerged from negotiations within the Basel Committee at the end of
April 2003, the General Secretariat of the Banking Commission has been able to estimate how the Basel II
treatment of the SME portfolio will affect the capital requirements of the major French banking groups and of the
French banking system as a whole. Since banks can, subject to certain conditions, choose between three different
methods for setting their capital requirements, three simulations were carried out.
To begin with, the small business portfolio of each banking group was divided into two components: very small
business customers (“petite clientèle”) with revenues less than or equal to EUR 1 million, and small to medium-sized
enterprises (“petites et moyennes entreprises”) with revenues between EUR 1 and 50 millions). The Basel II
reforms envisage applying different risk-weight curves to each of these two categories of exposures.
The following table shows, for each Basel II approach and for each component of the small business portfolio, the
average risk weight for the French banking system as a whole and for the major French banks. The risk weights were
calculated on the basis of first-quarter 2002 data, and are expressed as percentages of the current “Cooke” ratio.
These simulations shows that, all other things being equal, Basel II will permit the French banking system to
dedicate less capital to back-up loans to SMEs, whatever the choice of approach (Standardized, Foundation IRB,
or Advanced IRB). Furthermore, the Foundation IRB approach results in slightly lower average capital charges
than the Standardized Approach and the Advanced IRB approach results in a further slight reduction compared
to the Foundation IRB Approach.
The prudential treatment envisaged in the Basel II reforms should therefore reduce regulatory capital requirements
for credit risk on financing to small and medium-sized businesses, which continue to depend significantly on
banks as a source of financing. It should be noted that it is necessary under Basel II to add capital requirements
for operational risk and market risk, which are of the order of 15% of total capital charges.
Capital requirement for credit risk compared with Basel 1 (Basel 1 = 100)
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3|3 Stress tests of regulatory capital
in the context of Pillars 1 and 2
Market risk regulations require banks to calculate
Value-at-Risk and to conduct stress tests for their
major positions. The results must be provided to the
banks’ internal risk committees and to their
supervisors. The same approach has been adopted
for credit risk. The stress scenarios required under
Pillar 2  11 are intended to gauge the sensitivity of
capital measures to changes in the economic
environment or events affecting market or liquidity
conditions. These measures will help supervisors
to evaluate how prudently banks conduct their
analyses; and will enable supervisors, within the
framework of Pillar 2  12, to assess the overall
adequacy of banks’ capital in relation to the totality
of their actual and potential risks. The stress tests
can serve as the basis for discussion with banks on
the size of the capital “buffer” that they should
maintain in excess of regulatory minimums in order
to enable them to weather economic downturns.
Some banking economists (Khallouf, 2003) go
further, proposing that supplementary capital
required under Pillar 2 could serve as an explicit
countercyclical instrument, but the Basel Committee
has not adopted this approach, which it judges too
difficult to put in practice. Pillar 2 simply formalizes
a practice which has been adopted spontaneously
by a majority of banks and by the Banking
Commission and its General Secretariat over the past
several years.
3|4 Adjusting overall capital
requirements through the cycle
Banking economists have also proposed that,
without changing the methods used to calculate
capital requirements, the result of the calculation
should be adjusted downwards during periods of
recession in order to improve access to credit and
stimulate a rebound in economic activity (Ervin and
Wilde, 2001). This approach has not been formalized
by the Basel Committee because of the practical
11 See § 396 to 399 of the third consultative document.
12 See § 724 of the third consultative document.
13 “Comments on the exposure draft of the proposed amendments to the revised IAS 39 and IAS 32” (October 2002)
(www.banque-france.fr/gb/infobafi).
difficulties involved in determining where different
economies are in the cycle, and because different
bank business lines have different degrees of
sensitivity to the economic cycle. Under Pillar 2,
each bank supervisor is to assess, during periods of
recession, if the reduction in the amount of capital
that a bank holds in excess of its regulatory
requirements is consistent with its overall risk
profile.
However, the Basel Committee has opened a
dialogue with the IASB to find a way to translate
the notion of prudential losses over a one-year time
horizon into accounting terms. Current accounting
rules permit provisioning only for realized losses,
which leads to a concentration of provisions at the
low point of the cycle and thus amplifies the
financial cycle. To prevent recognition of losses on
defaulted loans from having a major procyclical
effect, banks must be able to anticipate, and to
assign provisions for expected but not yet realized
losses.
The initial declarations of the IASB in favor of
provisioning on the basis of expected losses were
met with reservations from American accounting
standard-setters, who have no equivalent
mechanism in their accounting framework; and also
from some banks, which posed questions
concerning the time horizon for provisioning, which
is one year in Basel II and the full maturity of the
exposure in the IASB proposals.
Without prejudging the decision of the IASB on this
topic, the Banque de France and the Banking
Commission hope that the dialogue between the
Basel Committee and the IASB on proposed
accounting standard IAS 39 will lead to a resolution
of the differences between the accounting and
prudential treatments of provisionable losses. The
Banque de France and the Banking Commission
expressed this hope in October 2002 in their
reactions 13 to the IASB’s proposed standards IAS 39
et IAS 32, and it was reiterated on the occasion of
the roundtables held by the IASB on IAS 39 in
March 2003.Financial stability and the New Basel Accord
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In conclusion, how banks evolve in the future will depend on how – with the guidance of their
managers and supervisors – they adapt to the opportunity that is being offered to them to improve
their strategic risk management.
It is expected that the new framework will, in the end, be less cyclical at the macro-economic level
than the framework that preceded it, for the reasons outlined above. An examination of the internal
rating methods used by French banks reveals that they have chosen voluntarily to seek relative
stability in their ratings through the cycle. Thus the conflict between sensitivity to changes in market
conditions and pricing based on risk is more apparent than real. The Basel II reforms, and in
particular the internal ratings-based approaches, will encourage the wider use of “risk-return” tools.
This will permit more accurate pricing of bank loans and will lead to a redistribution of bank credit
that better reflects banks’ management policies and their commercial strategies. Armed with more
risk-sensitive tools and a clearer vision of the future, banks should be in a better position to serve
their customers through the entire economic cycle, creating durable value in each business line.
Greater transparency in the profitability of each business line will require banks to assess the rate of
return expected from customers in a medium-term perspective. Both in validating internal rating
systems and in carrying out on-going supervision, banking authorities will seek to balance the
pursuit of greater risk-sensitivity with the goal of financial stability.Financial stability and the New Basel Accord
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Glossary
Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRB)
An approach in which ratings assigned by the bank
to its counterparties are used to calculate regulatory
capital requirements. This approach has two
variants. In the simplified version, referred to as
the «foundation» or “FIRB” approach, the bank
furnishes only the probability of default (PD) within
a one-year time horizon for each of its exposures.
In the more sophisticated version, referred to as the
«advanced» or «AIRB» approach, the bank furnishes
the other parameters used in the regulatory
calculation as well: loss given default, exposure at
default, and the maturity of the exposure.
Exposure at default (EAD)
This corresponds to the amount legally owed by the
client in the event of default, calculated at a time
horizon of one year. By convention, it is equal to the
current drawn amount at the moment the ratio is
calculated, plus a fraction of off-balance commitments
calculated by applying a credit conversion factor. In
the advanced IRB approach the bank estimates this
fraction, while in the standardized and foundation IRB
approaches it is specified by the supervisor.
Loss given default (LGD)
This corresponds to the economic loss sustained by
the bank as the result of the default of its counterparty,
after taking into account any guarantees. This loss is
calculated separately for each advance to the defaulting
counterparty.
Expected losses (EL)
This corresponds to the product EAD*PD*LGD
calculated using a time horizon of one year. Expected
losses should ordinarily be covered by provisions or,
if provisions are insufficient, by regulatory capital.
Unexpected losses (UL)
The probability distribution of losses within a
one-year time horizon makes it possible to calculate
a threshold level of losses at a confidence interval
which Basel II sets at 99.9 %. Unexpected losses
correspond to this threshold amount, less expected
losses. Unexpected losses should normally be covered
with regulatory capital.
Maturity (M)
The remaining term to maturity for the facility in
question. Maturity enters into the calculation implicitly
in the Foundation IRB approach (it is fixed at 2.5 years),
and explicitly in the Advanced IRB approach.
Economic capital
The amount of capital that a bank would allocate to
a transaction or a portfolio so that, in the event of
losses, the probability that these losses would be
less than capital is consistent with the bank’s internal
or external (i.e. credit rating) objectives. For
example, for a bank rated AA, economic capital
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